“How are you?” It’s a simple enough question. When asked by your physician, it deserves a good answer. The trouble is we really don’t know how to construct one.

Utilizing the underpinnings of behavioral economics theory (Epstein, 1973; Epstein, 2014; Kahneman, 2003), I’ve suggested (Pashko, 2016) our two basic choices involve using either percepts (experiential informational processing system) or concepts (rational-cognitive informational processing system). Using the perceptual approach, we would best answer by either describing our immediate sense-perceptions (somehow) and/or by indicating the limits of our physical abilities at that very moment. With the other approach, we would transform our sense-perceptions (somehow) into concepts and use them to make comparisons to how we think we should be, our theoretical optimum health state, or in relation to our health status at some time in the past. I put the parentheses around the word “somehow,” above, because one can never actually conceptualize any percept. For example, answer this question: “What is your subjective experience of the sound of middle ‘C’ on a piano or your feeling at the touch of a cleaning sponge?” I’ve used the word “somehow” to provide a sense of my own incredulity that anyone believes percepts could realistically and truthfully be represented by concepts. Do you remember how impossible it was for James (actor William Hurt), the teacher, to describe the sound of some music playing to Sarah (actor Marlee Matlin), a student who is deaf, in the 1986 film “Children of a Lesser God”? Though he moved well and pointed skyward along with the high notes, I still didn’t perceive music. Yet, many live with this mistaken belief and live their lives accordingly. Research from the behavioral economics literature strongly suggests answers about our health status significantly differ according depending on whether a predominately perceptual or a conceptual view is used.

Yet, even with this simple doctor’s question another problem arises, one seemingly more intractable than the first. It’s with the definition of “you,” the “me” who answers the doctor’s question. Which viewpoint do we choose for ourself, the conceptual or the perceptual me?

What? What do you mean, two of me?

The basics of behavioral economics demand and require a radical shift in our philosophy and psychology. Yes, the world exists simultaneously in two ways…and this includes us, our self-identity (Kahneman & Riis, 2005). This is the repair that psychology badly needs to make. It needs to accept and encourage these two competing yet complementary views of the realities of who we are. Because there has not been stronger support for these two views, many personal (e.g., anger, anxiety, stress, health) and societal problems (e.g., selfishness/ greed, corruption) continue on longer than they should (Epstein, 2014).

Though much of the focus on Freud’s work has been about id, ego and super ego, he acknowledged the ego’s counterpart in “Civilization and its Discontents,” but never named it. He describes a “more sharply demarcated feeling of ego-maturity,” which I take to relate to the rational-cognitive self of behavioral economics and “…a counterpart to it,” which his friend Romain Rolland continuously felt as “…a sensation of “eternity,” a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded- as if it were, ‘oceanic.’” It’s useful to note that Joseph Campbell has defined eternity as the breaking of the concept of time as opposed to it being an exceedingly long time period. And, of course, non-conceptual experiencing well describes the experiencing self of behavioral economics.

In 1781, Immanuel Kant described something similar to the two views of reality put forth by behavioral economists in his Critique of Pure Reason. His “noumenon” is a posited object or event that is known (if at all) without the use of ordinary sense-perception. By contrast, his “phenomenon” refers to anything that can be apprehended by, or is an object of the senses. Over the years this has been interpreted to mean there are two aspects of one world (i.e., appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves.) Here’s a helpful link to “Plato,” the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy about Kant’s life and work.

Way back, as early as the year 868, the Diamond Sutra (Soeng, 2000), “… in the words of the British Library, “the earliest complete survival of a dated printed book.” (Wikipedia, 2016), also can be read as offering a two selves theory. As I understand it, the first relates to any and every concept of a self whereas the second describes a “beingness” that is completely devoid of any conceptualization, including the term “beingness” itself. Note that I have used quotations around the word “beingness” in the previous sentence to bring the reader’s attention to the problem of language about how “something” can “be” without it existing conceptually. I believe this non-conceptual beingness (perceptual?) to be the heart of the question around the use of the term “no-self” (anatta) as it’s used in Eastern philosophy.

Neither the behavioral economics two-selves theory nor the Kantian notion of “two aspects of one world,” nor Eastern psychology’s notion of two selves (i.e., conceptual and non-conceptual) theory have yet substantially taken root in modern Western psychology. I’m not sure why. Perhaps what seems tangible and expressible, though erroneous, is preferred over the untransformed reality of the abstract. In my own writing, I’m suggested though “The rules of language and communication require a substitution[. But] blame can be placed on those who forget the transformation has occurred and willingly, though mistakenly, accept and psychologically exchange the concept for the percept.” (Pashko, 2016, p. 269).

In the simplest example, using the physical object we call a cup, most believe a cup is a “cup.” Consider how we have been taught. Teachers, parents and myriad others have shown us such objects and told us these were cups. However, “cupness” exists only as a mental concept about a class of objects. We were all shown physical examples of what reasonably constitutes “cupness.” Then we constructed our own personal mental classification scheme about it. Lastly, we continue to affirm or deny an object’s categorization based on our idealized organizing principle (e.g., holds too much volume, too skinny). It’s called a cup because it fits within our mental category of “cupness,” but a specific object is not a cluster of aspects that fit into a categorization. It’s a thing unto itself. As Bateson (1972, pp. 454– 455) suggests, “Always, the process of representation will filter it [reality] out so that the mental world is only maps of maps, ad-infinitum.” Conceptualization obscures reality because it’s representational. And with little needed in the way of deduction, we know a representation, like a map, is not the thing itself.*

With the physical object we mistakenly call a cup simply being an exemplar of our mental concept of “cupness,” where does this leave us when even the simplest of objects cannot be known? As before, the solution is offered via the truthfulness of sensory-perceptual reality, when objects are known through our sense-perceptions (i.e., shape and color by sight; temperature and rigidity by touch).

More difficult to comprehend than the example of a cup is what this dual view means for our self-identity, the one who answers questions about his/her health. Conceptual labels of identity, such as given and family names, gender, social role, type of work performed, etc. all can be used as frames of reference (i.e., identity viewpoints) for health status reporting. These conceptual labels, however, don’t define us fully. Further, these all change. As such, their use generates highly variable answers to health questions, such as those posed in patient-reported outcomes assessments during clinical research trials.

Let’s look to the previous solution, the perceptual, for an answer. Can you perceive and, of course, not say a word (conceptualize) about, your felt sense of beingness, consciousness and continuity over time? Is there anything actually wrong about having a self-identity that’s a percept, and not a concept, apart from the fact that you can’t say anything about “yourself?” I don’t believe so. Further, consider the upsides to a perceptual self-identity:

• Enhanced freedom, from the constraint of inappropriate or discriminatory labels,
• Decreased fear of pain, through the dissolution of any previously believed conceptual equivalence between self-identity and body-identity,
• Increased sense of authenticity, through a perceivable continuous linkage to same person you have always been,
• Enhanced resiliency to stress, from improved disinterest in overactive, ruminative thoughts (concepts),
• Improved consistency with language (i.e., when you say “my body” now the body becomes rightfully possessed through a pointer to a continuously existing, never changing self-identity),
• Acceptance of insights as valid, since percepts are processed equally as well as concepts.

Rectifying clinical psychology’s fascination with a conceptual view of self-identity, including the terms “self-concept,” “ego,” “id,” “super ego,” “ideal self,” etc. can be addressed by acknowledging and accepting that which exists before words—and the inaccuracy arising from the labeling of “what is” (i.e., the perceptual). The origin of our surprise from the findings garnered from the behavioral economics research literature (Kahneman, 2012; Wirtz, et al., 2003) stem from having excluded perceptual reality from equal standing with that of a conceptualized reality. Full acknowledgement of perceptual beingness (self-identity?) also holds promise for a way to understand other confounding phenomena, such as courage in the face of grave bodily danger, acceptance in death and dying, as well as the origin of insights. It may even permit understanding and harnessing of the power of “response shift” and it’s allied phenomenon, placebo response (Pashko, 2014).

Changing the way we view ourselves has implications for how we interact within the world at large. To the point about improving patient-reported outcomes (PROs) assessments, personal and societal acceptance of a perceptual view of self-identity, as at least as valid as any conceptual view, has the capacity to re-shape our relationship to our health, how we appraise it and why we utilize health care resources.

References

Anatta (n.d). retrieved from Wikipedia, 5 August 2016.

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.

Diamond Sutra (868). retrieved from Wikipedia, 5 August 2016.

Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited. Or a theory of a theory. American Psychologist, 28, 404–416.

Epstein, S. (2014). Cognitive-experiential theory. New York, NY: Oxford.

Freud, S. (2010). In J. Strachey (Trans.), Civilization and its discontents. New York, NY: Norton. (Original work published 1929).

Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. The American Economic Review, 93, 1449–1475.

Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Kahneman, D., & Riis, J. (2005). Living, and thinking about it: Two perspectives on life. In F. A. Huppert, N. Baylis, & B. Keverne (Eds.), The science of well-being (pp. 284 –304). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1781) Critique of Pure Reason. Retrieved from Project Guttenberg 5 August 2016. Link to book.

Pashko, S. (2014). Conceptual versus perceptual in- formation processing: Implications for subjective reporting. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 7, 219–226. Link to paper.

Pashko, S. (2016). Implication of the differences between our perceptual and conceptual views. Psychology & Neuroscience, 9(2), 267-281. Link to paper.

Soeng, Mu. (2000). Diamond Sutra: Transforming the Way We Perceive the World. Wisdom Publications. p. 58.

Wirtz, D., Kruger, J. Scolion, C. N., & Diener, E. (2003). What to do on spring break? Psychological Science, 14, 520–524.

*(Even if, like the comedian Steven Wright said, “I have a map of the United States… Actual size. It says, ‘Scale: 1 mile = 1 mile.’ I spent last summer folding it. I also have a full-size map of the world. I hardly ever unroll it,” the representation seems a good approximation.) Retrieved from Wright House.

Steven Pashko is a research clinician who studies treatment effectiveness and the value of health and healthcare. With a background in psychology and pharmacology, he conducts research and speaks about well-being. Notably, using behavioral economics theory, he submitted for a patent for way to identify people who respond to placebos.

Website: Steven Pashko.com

Copyright Steven Pashko, PhD (2016).

There are a number of definitions of mindfulness in use today that can be clarified for the uninformed or the novice to intermediate practitioner. One relates to “paying attention it in a particular way, on purpose, in the present moment nonjudgmentally (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Another defines it as “a state of active, open attention on the present” (Psychology Today, 2016). Still another indicates that it’s “…a technique in which distracting thoughts and feelings are not ignored but are rather acknowledged and observed nonjudgmentally” (The Free Dictionary, 2016).

These definitions more than often raise a few questions. Aren’t we already paying attention? Aren’t we always in the present moment—how couldn’t we be? Isn’t paying attention just paying attention? What’s “a particular way” mean, why don’t they ever say what this particular way is? Do these definitions needlessly obscure the positive benefits of mindfulness and only relate to some decrease in that ill-defined notion we call stress?

Among the many definitions of mindfulness, I like the definition provided by Gunaratana much better than most. He wrote, ”…there can be no precise answer, at least not in words. Words are devised by the symbolic levels of the mind, and they describe those realities with which symbolic thinking deals. Mindfulness is pre-symbolic. It is not shackled to symbols.” He goes on, “Mindfulness is a subtle process that you are using at this very moment. The fact that this process lies above and beyond words does not make it unreal-quite the reverse. Mindfulness is the reality that gives rise to words—the words that follow are simply pale shadows of reality.” (Gunaratana, 2002, p. 137).

I might add that mindfulness is “a process of continuing disinterest in concepts while continuing interest in the sense-perceptions (experience).” Awareness to consciousness that’s “…prior to the formation of concepts but after the activation of the sense receptors….” (Pashko, 2016).

The perceptual world exists even before we put words to it; for example, before a cup is named a “cup” it is something perceived by the visual and tactile senses. The words we add transform the world from what it is to what we think it is. Every thing we call a “cup” just bears some relationship to a mental reference standard we’ve created. That’s the “cup.” The physical object before us cannot be named. Kant’s (1724-1804) Critique of Pure Reason delves into this well. Yet we mistakenly believe and act as if the concept is the thing itself. Here’s where Gunaratana’s definition of Mindfulness becomes so helpful. It points us back to perceptual experience before “what is” becomes distorted by concepts.

We transform the world through conceptualizing in order to think. And that’s the rub, isn’t it? What many think is true about the world isn’t necessarily so. Because we think using concepts we logically juggle an already distorted view of “what it is.” My new article characterizes these inaccurate transformations as responsible for poor decision-making, the mental rigidity that leads to a lack of creativity, the bias at the root of discrimination, and stress. This is how mindfulness performs its fundamental work; the distortions generated by conceptualizing are seen in relation to direct perceptual experience and then re-aligned. If you don’t believe concepts influence how you reflect upon and act in this world, here’s a link about the inappropriate grasping at concepts. It’s here at:

Video: Overly strong grasping at concepts

Before moving forward, the terms concept and percept must be clarified because many have mixed up their meanings. Let’s return them to their proper use and see what happens. The most maligned word is “perceive” and the words mistakenly substituted with it are “conceive” and “believe.” As an example, I have heard people say, “I perceive you’re unhappy.” Uggh. The speaker can believe that person is unhappy or form a concept (conceive) that the person is unhappy but he cannot perceive unhappiness. Perceiving is a near kin to sensing but a distant cousin to conceiving, the process of forming a concept. Perceptions cannot be put into language because they occur prior to concept formation…and all words are concepts. For example, no one can say his or her subjective experience of the color blue. Blueness is a percept that perceived. Lastly, believing, of course, simply means accepting something as true, whether it is or isn’t. There is no link between the use and meaning of the words believe and perceive.

Mindfulness isn’t particularly special. It involves paying attention to sensory perceptual experience but not to the concepts/ thoughts in the mind. That’s what people fear about it, too. Out of ignorance, not many trust a mind without thoughts. Yet, when you ask, most will agree that it’s the thoughts in their mind that cause them stress. Certain hobbies such as yoga, crochet, jogging, etc., are inherently stress reducing because they help us get out of our heads full of thought. Though it isn’t special, it’s difficult to be mindful most of the time because we assume that thoughts are the source of our intelligence. But, this isn’t true. Words and thoughts arise from the clear background of awareness. It’s that clear background that’s intelligent, not the words or thoughts. When you speak, you do not know the third word next to come out of your mouth. Yet out it comes, guided by the clear background of intellectual processing. Recognize this as the origin of creativity and clear decision-making. Recognize this as the origin of unbiased truth and the “location” of where stress is relieved.

Yet, holding fast to our mistaken belief that conceptual processing rules our intelligence, we’re reluctant to give up our thoughts and hold tight to their use. This is the clinging that seems to make mindfulness so difficult, keeps creativity at bay, and stress levels at their highest. Actually practicing mindfulness is the only way to achieve relief from the burden of ruminative thoughts, compelling as those may be. One cannot just understand that mindfulness helps return us to creativity, optimal decision-making, and a more stress free existence, to achieve these optimal conditions. These are only achieved by breaking the clinging through the practicing of mindfulness so an open mind can be re-established. The muscle of attention needs to be built up from having become flabby from luxuriating within a constant stream of distorted and unhelpful thoughts. Once the attentional muscle is strong enough, you can point it wherever you like, at a problem, at a lover, or at a grand scene in nature without restrictive thoughts obscuring the view…and wouldn’t it be great to live like that?

Lamenting his inability to understand a full half of himself, the Nobel Prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman complained, “Odd as it may seem, I am my remembering self, and the experiencing self, who does my living, is like a stranger to me” (Kahneman, 2012, p. 390). His (and our own) remembering self is the one tied up in concepts. Here we are children/ adults, teachers/ business people, weak/ strong, etc. These concepts are distorted through implications of changelessness. But change does certainly occur so they cannot be who we are, our identity. However, you can look in the mirror to “see” that thing that has always looked back since you were a child; the thing that has continuously been “with” you. This is your perceptual identity that does your living. It seems a stranger because it cannot be named. Although this never-changing part of ourselves, the percept of who we are, cannot be expressed by words and concepts, comprehension of it becomes perfectly clear through mindfulness practice. Then, we not only know ourselves fully, we live through this fundamental, authentic identity and live more harmoniously in the world we can better relate to. Feel free to join in.

Gunaratana, B. H. (2002). Mindfulness in Plain English. Boston, MA:Wisdom.

Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Wherever You Go, There You Are: Mindfulness Meditation in Everyday Life. New York: Hyperion Books.

Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Mindfulness (n.d.) Psychology Today. retrieved from https://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/mindfulness on 20 June 2016

Mindfulness Meditation (n.d.) The Free Dictionary. retrieved from http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/mindfulness+meditation on 20 June 2016

Pashko, S. (2016). Implication of the differences between our perceptual and conceptual views. Psychology & Neuroscience, 9(2), 267-281. Link to paper.

Steven Pashko is a research clinician who studies treatment effectiveness and the value of health and healthcare. With a background in psychology and pharmacology, he conducts research and speaks about well-being. Notably, using behavioral economics theory, he submitted for a patent for way to identify people who respond to placebos.

Website: Steven Pashko.com

Copyright Steven Pashko, PhD (2016).